Underinvestment in Employer Training: Is a Mandate to Spend on Training the Answer? by Bishop, John  H.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
CAHRS Working Paper Series Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 
January 1993 
Underinvestment in Employer Training: Is a Mandate to Spend on 
Training the Answer? 
John H. Bishop 
Cornell University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies 
(CAHRS) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAHRS Working Paper Series by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Underinvestment in Employer Training: Is a Mandate to Spend on Training the 
Answer? 
Abstract 
American employers and their workers under invest in employer training. Under investment occurs 
because training generates externalities, because the tax system is biased against training investments, 
and because most workers are unable to finance general training because they lack access to loans to 
finance consumption during periods of heavy investment in training. School based occupational training 
ameliorates the under investment problem somewhat but it is not a complete answer to the problem. The 
French approach of requiring firms to spend at least 1.4 percent of their wage bill on continuing training of 
employees (if they are to avoid paying a tax) holds a good deal of promise but suffers from some critical 
flaws. These flaws are not basic to the tax offset design, however, so the paper concludes with a 
description of how a mandate to spend for the United States should be designed. 
Keywords 
French, worker, firm, education, wage, employee, skill, training, school, pay, investment, employer 
Comments 
This paper was presented at the Industrial Relations Research Association Meetings in Anaheim 
California on January 6, 1993. 
Suggested Citation 
Bishop, J. H. (1993). Underinvestment in employer training: Is a mandate to spend on training the answer? 
(CAHRS Working Paper #93-02). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/258 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/258 
12/29/92 Draft
UNDERINVESTMENT IN EMPLOYER TRAINING:
IS A MANDATE TO SPEND ON TRAINING THE ANSWER?
by
John H. Bishop
Cornell University
Working Paper #93-02
Center on the Educational Quality of the Workforce
and
Cornell Institute for Youth and Work
and
University of Warwick's Institute for Employment Research
and
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
607/255-2742
In the United Kingdom--44-926-53086
This paper was presented at the Industrial Relations Research Association Meetings in
Anaheim California on January 6, 1993. Its preparation was funded by a grant to the Center
on the Educational Quality of the Workforce, agreement number R1l7QOOOll-91, as
administered by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of
Education and by a grant to Cornell from the Pew Charitable Trust. The findings and
opinions expressed in this repon do not reflect the position or policies of the Office of
Educational Research and Improvement of the U.S. Department of Education. This paper has
not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School. It is intended to
make results of Center research, conferences, and projects available to others interested in
human resource management in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions.
h<\j\
UNDERINVESTMENT IN EMPLOYER TRAINING:
IS A MANDATE TO SPEND ON TRAINING THE ANSWER?
American employers and their workers under invest in employer training.
Under investment occurs because training generates externalities, because the
tax system is biased against training investments, and because most workers
are unable to finance general training because they lack access to loans to
finance consumption during periods of heavy investment in training. School
based occupational training ameliorates the under investment problem somewhat
but it is not a complete answer to the problem. The French approach of
requiring firms to spend at least 1.4 percent of their wage bill on continuing
training uf employees (if they are to avoid paying a tax) holds a good deal
of promise but suffers from some critical flaws. These flaws are not basic
to the tax offset design, however, so the paper concludes with a description
of how a mandate to spend for the united S~ates should be designed.
1. REAL EXTERNALITIES
The primary justification for public subsidy of education and training
is the fact that the individual who gets the education and training receives
only part of its benefits. When deciding on the type and amount of education
and training to undertake and how hard to study while at school, most
individuals are taking only private benefits--the higher after-tax income and
the prestige and consumption benefits of having an education--into account.
These private benefits account for only part of the total benefits to society
of education and training, however. People who have received more or better
education and training or who achieved more during the experience benefit
others in society by paying higher taxes, by making discoveries or artistic
contributions that benefit others in the society, by being more likely to give
time and money to charity, by being less likely to experience long periods of
hospitalization that are paid for by insurance or government, and in many
other ways (Haveman apd Wolfe 1983). Economists call social benefits such as
these "spilloversff or "externalities." Private decisions will lead to an
insufficient quantity and quality of education and training and insufficient
achievement by students and trainees, unless public agencies intervene and
partially subsidize the cost or add to the rewards. The externality case for
public subsidies of schooling has been generally accepted and well known for
a long time. Little attention has been focused, however, on the real
externalities generated by employer training. Training produces three kinds
of real externalities:
1.1. Discoveries Attributable to Good Training
High quality training benefits customers and the public as well as the
trainer and the trainee. When, for example, the dancers of the New York City
Ballet receive excellent training, the company benefits through greater ticket
revenue but the audience benefits as x.>ell befause they derive a largert"roperty 0
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consumer surplus from the performance. The COM SAT employee who figured out
how to double the lifetime of communication satellites by judicious use of the
rocket fuel remaining on board, benefitted customers and competitors at least
as much as he benefitted cOMSAT. The Aloha airlines pilot who landed his
plane after an explosive decompression and the loss of ~ major section of the
. fuselage, certainly raised the lifetime earnings of his passengers. On-the-
job training and experience were critical to the cOMSAT discovery and the safe
landing of the Aloha plane.
1.2 Disasters Attributable to Poor Training
When a worker screws up because of poor training, the customers and the
general public often lose just as much as the worker and the company.
Examples of disasters caused or contributed to by poor training are legion:
chernoble, Three Mile Island, Exxon Valdez, the shoot down of the Korean
Airlines 747 (pilot error caused the plane to be off course), and Greyhound
bus crashes i~ New York State. Tort law internalize some but not all of these
costs. A study of egregious physician errors in New York State found that
only one-eighth of them resulted in a malpractice claim. Damage awards are
typically paid by insurance funds that are imperfectly experience rated.
Where the public interest in assuring that training is of top quality is
manifest to all, training is often regulated or subsidized by government. The
Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, engage in such regulation.
However, for every big discovery or disaster that gets media attention
and generates a political response, there are millions of little discoveries,
unrewarded services, or unanticipated product failures that directly effect
consumers that do not generate political responses. Since customers lack low
cost access to accurate information on the quality of what they are buying,
the prices paid do not fully reflect quality differentials between different
providers. As a consequence, training which enhances quality and reliability
often generates benefits for customers which are not recognized or rewarded
by the market.
...
1.3 Poor Signalling of General Skills to Other Employers
The training provided by one employer benefits other employers and
consumers, not just the trainee and his/her employer (Bishop 1989). The
worker is more productive in future jobs, but these employers do not perceive
accurately the quality of the general OJT received by the worker and, as a
result, do not fully compensate the trained worker for their higher
productivity. Bishop's (1991) study of the relative productivity and the
profitability of new hires obtained results that are consistent with this
hypothesis. New hires who had received formal off-job training sponsored by
a previous employer made significantly more suggestions designed to improve
productivity, were more productive and profitable and were less likely to be
fired. If one accepts these findings as valid, the implication is a market
::'
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failure which reduces the payoff to worker investments in OJT. The ultimate
cause of this problem is the lack of effective signals of the quantity and
quality of training.
Institutions for Siqnallinq Occupational Competence--A Comparison: In
the U.S. labor market, hiring decision makers have a very difficult time
assessing the quality of the general human capital obtained from on-the-job
training. This fact increases turnover, lowers wages, and lowers
productivity. Since part of the reason for getting general training is to
improve the worker's marketability with other employers, not recognizing the
benefits of this training reduces the incentive to invest in general on-the-
job training. 1 Doing an especially good job of training employees will
immediately benefit trained workers when they leave the firm if the firm
develops a reputation for being a good trainer.2 Past experience with the
former employees of a firm is probably the primary determinant of a firm's
reputation as a trainer. Large firms that turn over a reasonable share of
their trainees are likely to develop a reputation (good or bad) for the
training that they provide. A positive reputation helps separating employees
find better jobs, and this in turn helps the firm recruit the best possible
candidates when it is hiring. Even though a good reputation as a trainer
forces them to pay higher wages in the post-training period, most firms have
a strong interest in establishing such a reputation. The armed forces are
aware of this, and consequently spend millions of dollars advertising the
quality and civilian usefulness of their training.
Most young workers without a baccalaureate degree, however, do not
obtain jobs at the large firms with established training reputations. The
smaller less well known firms where they find their first job are typically
unknown quantities when it comes to the quality and general usefulness of
their training.
The lack of full reward for improvements in general skills if one leaves
one's current employer reduces the incentives for the trainer and trainee to
devote time and energy to learning general skills that are not easily
signalled to the external labor market. High turnover exacerbates this
problem so under investment is greatest for temporary and seasonal employees
and for young workers generally.
Formal systems for certifying competencies gained through on-the-job
training exist in the United States, but they have not achieved the widespread
usage they deserve. The apprenticeship systems of Switzerland, Austria, and
Germany are probably the .best examples in the world of widespread and
effective systems of on-the-job training and competency certification. One
of the most important features of these apprenticeship systems is the
requirement that the apprentice pass written and practical examinations
covering the occupation's curriculum. If an employer cannot provide training
in all the skills included in.the curriculum, it is must arrange for. their
apprentices to receive instruction at another firm or at a special employer-
run school. The examinations are set and scored by a local committee of
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masters (skilled workers) and employers so the quality of the training
provided by the master and the firw is put to a public test. Passing this
apprenticeship exam is of benefit not only to the trainee, it is important to
the masters as well, for both their reputation amongst their peers and their
ability to recruit high-quality apprentices depends upon it_. As a result, 90
percent of German apprentices remain at one employer for the full 3-year
apprenticeship period, and 90 percent of these pass their test (on the first
or second try). The apprenticeship systems of the English-speaking nations
are based on time served rather than competencies achieved and are
considerably less successful in standardizing and upgrading the training that
occurs.
:'
The standardized curriculums and the proficiency exam at the end of the
apprenticeship mean that the quality and nature of the training is well
signaled to employers in Germany, switzerland and Austria. The result is that
the worker can count on benefiting from doing a good job in their
apprenticeship even if the training emp:'voyerdoes not keep them on. Since the
future payoff is certain, German apprentices are willing to start out at a
wage that is only about one-quarter of the wage they will be able to command
at the end of the apprenticeship. If the apprentices were adults, they could
not afford to accept so low a wage. They are, however, teenagers who because
they live at home are heavily subsidized by their parents. Consequently, the
liquidity constraint that is such a barrier to heavy investments in general
training in the US is much less of a problem in Germany.
2. TAX INDUCED DISTORTIONS OF THE TRAINING MARKET
2.1 The Non-Deductibility of Some Training Expenses
The benefits of training are taxed, but not all of the costs are
deductible. 3 Some of the time that trainees devote to employer sponsored
training comes from reducing leisure time. Employees taking job relat9d
college courses typically attend classes on their own time and always do their
homework on their own time. Japanese workers frequently take correspondence
courses related to their job and, when they are rotated to a new job, the
meticulous description of how the job is done written by its previous occupant
is studied at home. Japanese supervisors are expected to fill up slack time
with training. When Ronald Dore presented his passport at an out of the way
port of entry that seldom sees British passports, the supervisor called his
younger colleagues over and taught them about its intricacies while Dore
looked on. This little training session delayed passengers somewhat and
necessitated a sacrifice of on-the-job leisure but output--the number of
passengers processed--did not change (Dore and Sako 1989). Incentives to
undertake training are distorted if government does not share in the costs of
training to the same degree it shares in its rewards. When training time
substitutes for leisure time, that is what happens.
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2.1 The Progressive Income Tax
The second tax induced distortion arises from the fact that investments
in OJT are typically made at a time when the individual has no tax liability
or a lower-then-normal marginal tax rate and the benefits are received when
earnings and marginal tax rates are higher. As a result, the after-tax
benefits of an OJT investment are reduced more than the after-tax costs and
such investments are discouraged. Firms, on the other hand, train
continuously, so the marginal tax rates faced when the costs of training are
incurred and deductible are no different from those faced during the payoff
period.
3. HIGH BORROWING COSTS AND LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
-~
The third reason why society subsidizes education is the fa~lure of the
free market (in the absence of publicly funded loan guarantee p~ograms) to
Gtfer loans to young persons investing in their education. College studentl~
now have access to such loans, workers investing in general on-the-job
training do not.
Because of the fear of turnover, employers are reluctant to pay for
general training that is visible and useful in other firms. If the employer
is not willing to pay for general training, it will be offered only to those
workers who pay for it by accepting a lower wage during the training period
than could be obtained elsewhere. The more intensive the training, the
greater the required reduction in wages. Most workers are unwilling to accept
a large reduction in their current standard of living, and, since they are
unable to borrow at reasonable interest rates, they forego the investments in
general on-the-job training.' If they do undertake such investments, they do
so only if extremely high rates of return are obtained.
Most young workers are liquidity constrained--that is they are unable
to shift as much consumption from the future into the present as they would
like because they have neither assets which can be depleted nor access to
credit at reasonable terms. Half of households headed by someone under the
age of 25 have less than $746 in financial assets and 19 percent have no
financial assets at all. Half of households headed by someone between 25 and
34 have less than $1514 in financial assets and 13 percent have none (Survey
of Consumer Finances 1984). Borrowing against the equity in one's home is a
possibility for some but only 34 percent of households with heads under the
age of 35 own a horne and many of the houses have been owned for only a short
while, so the equity that can be borrowed against is small. Even with
collateral, the loans available to individuals usually carry higher interest
rates than those charged businesses.
Studies of the willingness of consumers to substitute consumption over
time have all concluded that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
no higher than one and most studies conclude it is .5 or below (Friend and
Blume 1975; Hall 1988; Hubbard and Judd 1986). A substitution elasticity of
-~
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.5 implies that reducing a liquidity constrained worker's wage by one half (in
order to pay for general training) roughly quadruples the worker's marginal
utility of consumption. Such a worker would be willing to give up four
dollars of future income in return for one dollar of current income. The
liquidity constrained worker finds employment contracts in which the employer
shares the costs of general training a very attractive proposition (Glick and
Feuer 1984; Feuer, Glick and Desai 1987).
Firms have better access to capital markets and are thus more willing
than workers to trade off future earnings for present earnings. The
compensation packages that result from the asymmetric access to capital
markets and the progressive tax structure reflect the worker's strong
preference for compensation now rather than later. In effect, firms offer new
hires a loan that will be canceled if a separation occurs. Firms do not
require repayment of the loan when separations occur for the same reasons that
banks do not offer large unsecured loans without a government guarantee of
payment. The administrative costs of obtaining repayment are extremely high
and bankruptcy is a real option for someone with zero assets. Firms, however,
undertake to finance some of the costs of general OJT only when their
investment yields a return that is sufficient to pay for both the cost of
capital and the risk of turnover. This reduces employer investments in
general on-the-job training below the level that would have prevailed if
workers were able to borrow at the same interest rates as employers.
Summary of Section 1 to 3: Evidence has been presented that on-the-job
training produces spillover benefits just as schooling does. When an
individual receives extensive, high-quality on-the-job training, they also
benefit others in the society by paying higher taxes, by receiving fewer
government transfers, by making scientific and technological advances and
artistic contributions. In addition, labor market distortions, such as the
lack of access to loans and lack of certification of OJT, cause individuals
and firms to choose less OJT and lower quality OJT thar. is desirable from
society's point of view. There would appear to be a need for the government
to promote increases in on-the-job training. We now turn to a discussion of
how government can promote training in general skills.
4. CAN VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN SCHOOLS SUBSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYER TRAINING?
The primary response of most societies to the tendency of employers and
workers to under invest in skill training is to establish occupational training
programs in schools. This ameliorates the problem of under provision of skill
training, but school based training cannot replace some kinds of employer
training and is generally less effective than employer provided training in
the same skills.
Often, training in a skill can only be organized by the employer. This
is obviously the. case when skills are specific to the firm or partially
specific to the firm, but is also sometimes the case for completely general
skills as well. General skills are often easier to learn when they are
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integrated into a training program that is specific to the context of a
particular firm. The need for particular general skills is often generated
by the introduction of new technology and new equipment or a reorganization
of the business. The firm must select which skill is to be taught and when.
Since firms quite reasonably desire to have all employees use the same word
processing and financial analysis programs, the selection of such a program
must be centralized. IBM first developed the FORTRAN computer language and
then taught it to its employees and customers. Colleges and universities
eventually offered courses in FORTRAN, but it took many years for schools to
take over the bulk of the teaching of this very general skill.
Even when the same skills are to be taught, employer provided training
is generally more effective than school based training? Seven reasons appear
to account for it. First, most individuals who obtain occupational training
from a school do not obtain jobs in the occupation they studied in school,
while most of those trained by an employer stay in the occupation. For
graduates of high school vocational training programs in the US, only 43
percent of the employed graduates out of school between one and ten years had
a training related job (broadly defined) in the 1985 National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (Campbell et al., 1987). The proportion of CETA participants
whose occupational field 12 months after completion of classroom training
matched their field of training was only 41 percent for clerical training, 39
percent for training in operative occupations and 29 to 32 percent for
professional and craft training (Barnow 1985).
When, on the other hand, employers are heavily involved in providing
occupational training, it is much more likely to be used. Mangum and Ball
(1986) found in their analyses of NLS data that employer controlled training
institutions have much higher training related placement rates. Using a
procedure of matching training fields against jobs, they found that the
proportion of male graduates who had at least one job in a related field was
85 percent for company training and 71 percent for apprentices~ip but only 52
percent for vocational-technical institutes and 22 percent for proprietary
business colleges. The rates for females were 82 percent for company training
but only 59 percent for nursing schools, 61 percent for vocational-technical
institutes and 55 percent for proprietary business colleges. six months after
pass~ng a German apprenticeship examination, 68 percent of those with civilian
jobs were employed in the occupation for which they were trained (much more
narrowly defined) (Federal Institute for Vocational Training, 1986).
If the skills and knowledge developed in a training program are not
used, they will rapidly deteriorate. In one set of studies, students tested
2 years after taking a course had forgotten 1/2 of the college psychology and
zoology, 1/3 of the high school chemistry, and 3/4 of the college botany that
had been learned (Pressey and Robinson, 1944).
The second reason why learning skills on a job is
learning those skills in a classroom is the fact that
to be preferred to
trainees are well-
motivated because skills developed are almost certain to be used, and because
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promotions and pay increases go to those who do well. Third, the training is
generally tutorial in nature and this is known to be an effective teaching
method. Fourth, since training is generally done by supervisors and coworkers
who are aware of the trainee's progress and can give necessary corrective
instruction. Fifth, the equipment and materials necessary to the training are
generally readily available at the work site and time on the machine for the
trainee can generally be arranged without disrupting production. When schools
provide the training, equipment must be specially purchased and keeping the
equipment up-to-date is often prohibitively expensive. Sixth, the trainer
(not just the trainee) is held accountable for success since the training is
designed to increase productivity and supervisor/trainers are held accountable
for the productivity of the work group. Finally, when employers provide
training the trainee's time tends to be used more efficiently. Because they
are paying for both the trainer and the trainee's time and receive most of the
benefits, employers have much stronger incentives to select cost effective
training strategies tliiinschools which neither pay the time costs of the
trainee nor receive any of the direct benefits of the skills that are
developed.
6. THE FRENCH MANDATE ro SPEND
Legislated mandates to spend on formal training are a central component
of the French system of continuing training. Employers and unions established
the foundations of this system with the National Intersectoral Agreement of
9 July 1990 (later amended to cover managers and professionals on 30 April
1971. This agreement was enacted into law on the 16th of July 1971. Every
employer with 10 or more employees was obligated to spend .8 percent of its
wage bill on continuing education and training of its employees or pay a tax
equal to the difference between its obligated and actual training expenditure.
In addition, every employer regardless of size was required to spend. 5
percent of its wage bill on apprenticeship training or pay a tax equal to the
difference between its obligated and actual training expenditure.
The mandated training tax for continuing training was raised to 1.0
percent of wage bill in 1974, to 1.1 percent in 1977, and to 1.2 percent in
1987. Beginning January 1993, the mandated spending level is 1.4 percent.
Since the initiation of the mandate, the share of the wage bill spent on
formal training has risen substantially, from 1.35 percent in 1972 to 3.14 in
1990. Firms are required to develop a training plan and present it to the
firm's labor management committee. The auditing of the firm's reports of
training expenditure is accomplished by a staff of 120 controllers.
The obligation to invest in continuing education and training can be
fulfilled by five different types of expenditure:
* the firm's own formal training programs (These must have a curriculum,
develop a skill that is useful at other firms and be located away from
the trainee's normal work station.),
\.
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* external training (often cooperative programs organized by groups of
employers) ,
*
training insurance funds agreed to by management and labor,
* government approved training programs for unemployed youth who have no
qualifications (Within the overall 1.4 percent mandate, firms are
required to s.pend at least 0.3 percent of their wage bill on these
programs or be subject to the tax), and
*
wages and tuition of employees taking courses at schools and colleges
(Firms are required to spend at least 0.15 percent of their wage bill
on in-school training of employees or be subject to tax. Firms with
fewer than 10 employees are subject to this requirement as well.).
The first panel of Table 1 indicates how firms of different size
allocated their eligible training expenditures in 1988. Internal training
accounted for 28 percent of the eligible training expenditures reported to
French authorities by all firms, 50 percent of the expenditures reported by
firms with 2000+ employees, but only 1 percent of expenditures reported by
firms with 10-19 employees. External training programs, many ~f which are
provided by organizations formed by industry councils and other groups of
employers, accounted for another 35 percent of eligible training expenditures.
The firms with 50 to 2000 employees are the heaviest users of this kind of
training.
Union-management training insurance funds account for 37 percent of the
eligible training expenditure of firms with 10-19 employees but only 4 percent
of the expenditures of the largest firms. Contributions to government
approved training programs for unemployed youth account for 25-27 percent'of
training expenditures by firms with under 50 employees and 13 percent of the
training expenditures of firms with 2000+ employees. wages and tuition for
employees attending schools and universities account for 7 percent of training
expenditures.
French leadeFs believe the training mandate has stimulated the growth
of formal training and aided French competitiveness. Studies have found that
individuals receiving training are significantly more likely to receive
internal promotions and 2 to 3 times more likely to transition from unskilled
to skilled occupations. This is just as true for training that the worker has
initiated as for training taken at the initiative of the employer. For those
who were in unskilled jobs in 1980, individuals who initiated their own
training in the subsequent 5 years had a 58 percent probability of being in
a skilled job in 1985 and those who took training at the behest of their
employer had a 55 percent chance of being in a skilled job. Those who
received no formal training between 1980 and 1985, by contrast, had only a 20
percent chance of moving up to a skilled job by 1985 (Berton and Podevin
1991)
.
As in other nations, formal training is more extensive at large firms
and for more skilled workers (see Table 1). In 1990, firms with 10-19
employees spent 1.30 percent of their wage bill on formal training, barely
more than the 1.2 percent mandate. By contrast, firms with more than 2000
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employees spent 4.99 percent on average on formal training, more than three
times the mandate. Those receiving training averaged about 46 hours during
the year. This varied little by firm size and skill level. The incidence of
training, however, varies substantially. Slightly over one-half of
supervisors, technicians, managers and professionals receive formal training
each year. One in four craft, sales and clerical workers and one in eight
unskilled operatives receive formal training each year. The incidence of
formal training is considerably higher in France than in the United states.
The French mandate to spend has the following advantages:
'"
Employer needs for skill upgrading determine the allocation of funds so
the risk that people will be trained for jobs that do~'t exist or in
skills that do not increase productivity is small.
'"
Training occurs at the work site where it is most effective.
'"
Training funds are available to the employed as well as the unemployed.
'"
Decision making is decentralized.
However, the French system also has some important disadvantages:
'"
Six-million of the 9 million French workers employed by firms subject
to the training tax are at firms which regularly exceed the mandated
amount. The training mandate clearly has no effect on the incentive to
train these 6 million workers.
'"
Another 27 percent of workers are employed at firms which report
spending exactly 1.2 percent (the threshold that applied in 1990) of
their wage bill on training. While some of these firms have increased
their training expenditure to the required minimum because of the
mandate, administrators of the program report that many smaller
companies simply stop keeping track of their training expenditure once
they reach the tax threshold. It is not clear, how much of the
response to the mandate is creative accounting and how much is a real
behavioralchange. .
'" Firms whose expenditures on formal training would have been below 1.4
percent of payroll in the absence of the mandate, save in taxes the
full amount' of any increase in expenditures on training. Some
administrators of the French program fear that this has induced a
careless attitude toward costs and reduced the efficiency of training.
'" Expenditures on formal training reduce the firm's tax liability; but
the costs of informal training do not. This generates a strong
incentive to substitute formal training for informal training despite
the fact that there is no evidence (either of an empirical or
theoretical variety) that formal training is to be preferred over
informal training (Bishop 1991).
'" Formal training is subject to substantial economies of scale, so small
firms are put at a disadvantage. The kind of training which small
companies excel at--close supervision and informal training by the
owner--is not eligible for subsidy. Small firms must join together in
cooperative efforts to achieve the scale necessary to make formal
training feasible.
Most of these problems can be avoided, however, by modifying its design.
<-
12/29/92 2:05AM IRRA-EQ~ 11
6. An American Training Mandate
The source of most of the problems with the French training mandate is
the 100 percent offset of training expenditure for tax obligation. It is this
feature that results in a few firms (those spending below the mandated level)
having little incentive to train efficiently and most other firms facing no
incentive to increase training above the level they would have chosen in the
absence of the program. An American training mandate can avoid these problems
by offering only a 20 or 25 cent reduction in tax for every dollar of training
expenditure. This generates strong incentives to use cost effective training
techniques. It also means that the tax rate can be low and yet an incentive
to expand training is generated even for companies that normally spend 4
percent of their wage bill on training.
All employers--profit making, nonprofit, and governmental--should be
subject to the training tax. As an administrative convenience, the mandate
should not apply-to very small organizations. Furthermore, it should set
proportionately higher training targets for larger firms. This can be
accomplished by making the training tax progressive. For example, there might
be no tax on the first $40,000 of the firm's wage bill, a 0.5 percent tax on
the next $5,000,000 of the wage bill, a 0.75 percent tax on the next.
$5,000,000 of wage bill and 1.0 percent on all wages paid above that. With
a 20 cents on the dollar tax offset, a 1 percent tax rate implies that the
very largest firms would not be released from paying tax until they were
spending over 5 percent of their wage bill on formal training programs. Once
accountants are given the task of identifying the full costs of their existing
formal training programs (including the time of trainees), this will not be
a difficult target for most companies to meet. French firms with more than
2000 employees currently spend this proportion of their payroll on formal
training.
As a quality control measure, firms would be required to give
certificates describing the skills taught and competencies achieved to
trainees at the. completion of training. These certificates would make the
individual more marketable at other firms and strengthen worker incentives to
engage in training. As a further quality control measure, companies above a
certain size would be required to develop a training plan and present it to
a training advisory committee that contains worker representation. Public
companies would be expected to describe their investments in formal training
in their annual report. In order to avoid a conflict of interest in the
allocation of training investments, tax offsets would not be available for
training received by the owner and top managers.
Initially, the categories of training expenditures that could offset the
tax would be similar to those in France: apprenticeship training programs,
industry training funds, labor-management training funds, tuition
reimbursements for jOb-related training, contributions of materials or staff
time to vocational-technical institutions, the employer's share of JTPA OJT
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training ef:penses and the firm's formal training programs for new and
continuing employees.5 The costs of certain types of informal training (as
specified in Department of Labor regulations) would also be used to offset the
training tax. Apprenticeship programs for 16 to 21 year olds for high skill
jobs generate particularly large externalities, so it would be desirable to
structure the mandate to give special encouragement to this kind of training.
This could be done by offering a larger tax reduction (eg. 40 cents per
training dollar rather than the 20 cents per training dollar) for expenditures
on apprentice training programs that meet quality standards promulgated by
industry associations and approved by the Department of Labor. Other types
of training (for example, training which awards industry recognized
credentials or academic credit) might be similarly encouraged by offering a
better tax offset ratio.6
The major drawback of the system described so far is its tendency to
promote formal training programs at the expense of job rotation and other more
informal-methods of learning and training on the job. Japanese workers are
better trained than American workers not because they are more likely to take
company sponsored courses (expenditure on such courses is in fact lower in
Japan than in the US and France, Dore and Sako 1989), but because they receive
continuous upgrading training through job rotation and the Kaizen process.
It is very important for an American training mandate to promote informal
learning on the job through job rotation, obtaining assistance from coworkers,
self study and learning by doing. The Department of Labor should be tasked
with the job of writing regulations which would accomplish this.
One strategy that needs to be investigated would be to award training
tax offsets for learning outcomes rather than for training expenditure. The
MacCalister Commission is considering whether the Department of Labor should
promote the development of a nationwide skill certification system for
industry and occupation specific skills. If the Department of Labor decides
to go ahead with such a program, employer use of the certification system
could be insured by awarding training tax offsets to firms which train their
workers to industry standards and arrange for them to be tested and certified.
Incentives to engage in self study could be enhanced by giving those who
demonstrate their competence a small monetary award along with their skill
certificate. Without such a system of incentives to attract workers and firms
into the skill certification process, I doubt that a skill certification
system will gain the scale necessary for sustainability.
When designing .a training mandate there will be a temptation to become
highly prescriptive about the type of training that is to be allowed to offset
the tax. The failure of prescriptive regulation of schooling inputs to
produce quality outcomes is a lesson that the designers of a training mandate
need to take to heart. We know that training is generally a good investment,
but we do not know which types of training are more effective, when and for
whom? The profit motive is probably what has insured its cost effectiveness
in the past. Too many regulations could get in the way of the profitability
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calculation and reduce it's effectiveness.
The training mandate outlined above will increase the incidence and
intensity of employer training without changing its basic character or its
distribution. Employers clearly believe that formal training of skilled
workers generally yields larger productivity benefits than training unskilled
workers. The result is that managers and skilled workers get more formal
training than unskilled workers. Some analysts view this as a problem that
requires government intervention.
A training mandate could be structured with a bias toward training those
with less skill. Training received by low wage workers or young workers
might generate higher tax offsets. Alternatively, separate training taxes
could be imposed on exempt and non-exempt employees and the mandate could
apply separately to each group of,workers.
Should profit and productivity calculations be the sole determinants of
who gets trained? Or should a training mandate favor the training of the
firm's least skilled workers? The answer is r~t clear. While the absence of
loan financing of general training applies most of all to young and
disadvantaged workers, the externalities that training is thought to generate-
-discoveries, artistic contributions, reduced risks of catastrophic errors--
appear to arise primarily in high level occupations.
How should distributional issues be evaluated? Should the goal be lIequal
opportunity to compete for jobs which offer training'or~qualizing training
outcomes?'\ By an intergenerational standard, employer training comes off
better than schooling. Family background is more determinative of schooling
outcomes than employer training outcomes. How far should the goal of
equalizing outcomes as opposed to opportunities be carried? The longer a
student stays in school the more educational subsidies she accumulates. Does
this make public subsidy of higher education undesirable? While evidence
about externalities can inform policy choices, the judgement is ultimately a
political and moral one.
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Table 1
Formal Training in French Companies
by Size of Firm
Number of Employees
10-19 20-49 50-499 500-1999 2000+ Total
Share of 1988 Training Expenditure for
Internal Training 1% 2% 6% 17% 50% 28%
Joint External Training 26% 31% 42% 46% 29% 35%
Union-Management Funds 37% 33% 22% 11% 4% 11%
Training of Youth 27% 25% 23% 19% 13% 19%
Time off to Attend School 9% 9% 7% 7% 4% 7%
100 100 100 100 100 100
Traininq's Share of the Wage Bill
in 1974 .66% .86% 1.14% 1.45% 2.59% 1.63%
in 1990 1.30% 1.45% 2 . 17% 3.20% 4.99% 3.14%
Hours of Training 41 43 41 44 53 46
per Trainee-1990
Share Receiving Traininq in 1990
All Employees 8% 11% 23% 39% 53% 32%
Unskilled Operatives 2% 4% 9% 15% 22% 13%
Skilled Operatives 6% 7% 16% 29% 48% 25%
Other Non-Supervisory 8% 11% 24% 37% 46% 29%
Supervisors & Tech. 15% 19% 38% 55% 70% 53%
Managers & Professional 13% 21% 41% 62% 71% 50%
Share of Covered Employment 5% 15% 32% 19% 300;" 100%
Source: Centre d"Etudes et de Recherches sur les Qualifications, Statistiaue de la
Formation Professionnelle Continue Financee par les Entreorises: Annees 1989-1990.
Tables 13 and Fabienne Derton & Gerard Podevin, "Vingt Ans de Formation
Professionnelle Continue: De la Promotion Sociale a la Gestion de l'Emploi,"
Formation Emoloi, No. 34, Avril-Juin 1991, 14-30, Table 2 & 3.
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ENDNOTES
1. Lack of information about the quality of general OJT received can increase investment in general
OJT only under the very unlikely circumstances of very high retention rates and large differentials
between the rates at which employers and employees trade off present before-tax income for future
before-tax income. Under these circumstances the employer's desire to invest in general training
may be stronger than the worker's desire. Because the wage will have to be increased by an
equivalent amount, employers cannot benefit from (and therefore do not pay for) general training
that is visible to other employers. Consequently, as such training becomes more visible to other
employers, the calculus that determines the amount of training shifts to give greater weight to the
very high discount rates faced by the worker, possibly reducing IDvestment in general training. The
condition that would have to be satisfied is that the retention rate would have to be equal to or
greater than the ratio of the firm and worker discount factors. Even if the worker were to face
yearly interest rates that were double the firm's rate (e.g., 30 percent rather than 15 percent), the
yearly retention rate would have to be above 85 percent. Retention rates for the first year at a job
are seldom above 50 percent and average yearly retention rates for all em ployees new and old
seldom exceed 85 percent. Yearly retention rates of employees who have been at the firm for many
years may exceed 85 percent, but t!1ese more mature workers will typically have better access to
capital markets than younger workers and face a tax regime that is neutral to OJT. This discussion
has been based on the theoretical analysis of the training decision presented in Bishop and Kang
(1984, 1988).
2. Well-trained employees who leave the firm that provided the training may benefit if their new
employer eventually learns of their greater-than-anticipated productivity and makes later adjustments
to the wage or bases a promotion on it. In the model presented in Bishop and Kang (1984,1988),
high renegotiation costs prevent such adjustments from occurring at the first employer. If a third
period was added to the model and retention in the second job modeled, the same assumption of
high renegotiation costs would prevent the worker from benefiting from better-than-expected
training in the second job. If one were to relax the assumption that post-training wage rates are
prespecified and analyze a multi-period model, the size of the distortion to training investment
decisions would be reduced, but it would not disappear. Productivity is measured with error so one
could never expect the new employer to perceive the full value of the worker's greater-than-
anticipated training. Furthermore, other employers remain ignorant of greater-than-anticipated
productivity. To all intents and purposes this greater productivity is specific to the firm, so the
worker will only receive a small share of this greater productivity in higher wage rates.
3. If training an employee causes a reduction in output or necessitates an increase in hours paid, profits
and thus taxes are reduced. If workers pay for training by accepting lower wage jobs, individual
income tax payments are reduced. In both of these cases, training costs are effectively deductible
in the year they are incurred. If all individuals pay taxes every year at the same marginal tax rate,
the tax system would not distort decisions to invest in OJT. In fact, however, some training costs
are not deductible and tax rates are generally higher when benefits are being received than when
costs are being incurred, so the tax system discourages training investments.
4. Becker clearly recognized the existence of liquidity constraints in his 1%2 paper. "Since employer
specific skills are part of the intangible assets or good will of firms and can be offered as collateral
along with tangible assets, capital would be more readily available for specific than for general
investments (p.42)." He did not, however, explicitly analyze how such constraints might influence
the tenure proftle of wages and thus induce employers to share the costs of general training.
Parsons (1972) points out that "The worker's ...discount rate will affect the firm's choice of wage
policies !t can be shown that firms will decrease the worker's share of specific investment as the
workers discount the fuWre more heavily (p.1129):
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5. To ensure that only training gets subsidized and not vacations or motivational sales meetings,
subsidizable expenditures might be defined to exclude: (1) travel to a remote site other than the
company's national or the appropriate regional headquarters; (2) housing and food expenses of more
than $100 a day; (3) costs of training non-employees, part-time employees working less than 50
hours a month, or employees for whom more that 50 percent of compensation comes from
commissions; and (4)payrnents to speakers or presenters of a training session of more than $100
or $200 per contact hour, whichever is higher. The costs of developing a training package or system
for use in training one's own staff would be an allowable expense.
6. The French promote particular kinds of training by having sub mandates requiring all firms to spend
at least X percent of wage bill on a particular category of formal training. Unless a case can be
made that it is undesirable for some firms to specialize in one kind of training (sayapprer:.ticeships)
while others specialize in other forms of training, sub mandates will be a less efficient way of
stimulating particular types of training than varying the tax offset ratio. ITit is felt that all workers
regardless of where they are employed should have access to certain types of external training, the
best way to promote it is to locate it in schools and subsidize its costs there.
